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The Washington Legislature in its 1981 session enacted
Senate bill 3158,1 the Tort and Product Liability Reform Act, a
comprehensive change in product liability and tort law in the
State of Washington. This change, perhaps the most sweeping
legislative involvement in Washington tort law in this century,
was accomplished after many years of extremely bitter political
conflict over product liability and tort reform; Senate bill 3158,
however, passed the legislature with little of the acrimony previ-
ously associated with the issue. This article explores the involve-
ment of the legislature in product liability and tort reform his-
torically, reviews the legislative history of Senate bill 3158, and
discusses the relationship of the changes contained in the Act to
the present law of the State of Washington.
I. THE RECENT HISTORY OF PRODUCT LIABILITY AND TORT
REFORM IN WASHINGTON
Because of rapidly increasing insurance premiums, concerns
about the stifling of technological innovation, and general con-
cerns about liability, the business community and the insurance
industry in the State of Washington exerted considerable influ-
ence on the legislature of the mid-1970's to examine the ques-
tions of product liability and tort law. In 1976, Washington
State House and Senate committees held hearings on product
liability and the newly elected Insurance Commissioner formed a
product liability task force. That task force drafted legislation
that was submitted to the legislature in the 1977 session. Fur-
thermore, bills dealing with insurance reporting requirements'
* B.A. (magna cum laude) Yale University, 1973; J.D. University of Washington,
1976; Washington State Senator, 34th District, and Chairman of the Senate Select Com-
mittee on Tort and Product Liability; attorney with Karr, Tuttle, Koch, Campbell,
Mawer & Morrow, P.S., Seattle, Washington.
1. Act of April 17, 1981, ch. 27, 1981 Wash. Laws 112.
2. H. R. 1162, 45th Wash. Leg., Reg. Seas. (1977); S. 2744, 45th Wash. Leg., Reg.
Sess. (1977).
3. H. R. 1416, 45th Wash. Leg., 1st Ex. Seas. (1977) (bill relating to products liabil-
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and two bills sponsored by the Judicial Council to adopt contri-
bution' and comparative fault were introduced.5 None of the
bills was enacted.
The House Judiciary Committee held hearings on product
liability during the interim between the 1977 and 1979 sessions
of the legislature. House bill 241,6 introduced in 1979, was the
product of those hearings. The bill provided for extensive
changes in tort and product liability, but it did not succeed in
passing the legislature.
Other bills introduced in the 1979 session included a bill
providing for insurance reporting, a bill calling for extensive
changes in product liability law,' a bill modeled on the first draft
of the Commerce Department's Model Uniform Product Liabil-
ity Act,' and a bill establishing contribution among tortfeasors. 10
None of these bills succeeded. During the 1979 sessions principal
attention focused on Senate bill 2333,11 a fundamental revamp-
ity insurance rates); H. R. 1411, 45th Wash. Leg., 1st Ex. Sess. (1977) (bill defining prod-
ucts liability insurance); H. R. 1410, 45th Wash. Leg., 1st Ex. Seas. (1977) (bill proposing
insurance reporting requirements).
4. S. 2290, 45th Wash. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1977); H. R. 411, 45th Wash. Leg., 1st Ex.
Sess. (1977). Both bills would have created the right of contribution and apportionment
among tortfeasors.
5. H. R. 524, 45th Wash. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1977). The bill, providing that contribu-
tory fault of the plaintiff himself or attributed to him, or of any person whose conduct
might have barred plaintiffs recovery, does not bar recovery, but diminishes the award
of compensatory damages proportionately, according to the contributory fault.
6. H. R. 241, 46th Wash. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1979). The bill provided for comparative
fault, contribution, a 12-year statute of repose, a definition of a "product liability
action," and a section that allowed state of the art to be a defense to a design defect
case.
7. H. R. 403, 46th Wash. Leg., Reg. Seas. (1979). The bill required extensive report-
ing by liability insurers for product liability and government tort liability insurance.
8. H. R. 843, 46th Wash. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1979); S. 2333, 46th Wash. Leg., Reg. Sess.
(1979).
9. S. 3073, 46th Wash. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1979). This bill was sponsored by the author
and was taken directly from the first draft of the Model Uniform Product Liability Act
that was published in the Federal Register on January 12, 1979, for public comment. 44
Fed. Reg. 2,996 (1979). After receipt of public comment to the first draft, the final draft
of the Model Uniform Act was promulgated by the United States Department of Com-
merce on October 31, 1979. Id. at 62,713.
10. S. 2677, 46th Wash. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1979) (bill providing essentially for contri-
bution among or between joint tortfeasors).
11. S. 2333, 46th Wash. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1979). The bill went through many changes
during the 1979 session of the Legislature. Senate bill 2333, as introduced, abolished
joint and several liability, adopted contribution, established extensive affirmative
defenses to a product liability claim, adopted an 8-year statute of repose for products
claims, allowed a special defense to aircraft manufacturers with "an individual defense,"
and permitted the allocation of fault to persons not a party to the action. Substitute
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ing of Washington's tort and product liability law. The bill
passed both houses in different forms, but was defeated in the
waning hours of the 1979 session when the Senate Majority
Leader refused to permit the bill to emerge from the Senate
Rules Committee. The senate thereafter passed Senate Resolu-
tion No. 14012 at the end of the 1979 session, establishing a Sen-
ate Select Committee on Tort and Product Liability Reform to
study the tort system in this and other states and to make rec-
ommendations to the legislature concerning possible legislation
in the area of tort law and product liability law.13
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SENATE BILL 3158
As chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Tort and
Product Liability Reform, the author sought to obtain all availa-
ble objective evidence concerning the need or lack of need for a
product liability law. There was considerable need for objective
materials concerning the issue of product liability and tort
reform given the rash of charges and countercharges in the
debate on product liability and tort reform in the 1979 session of
Senate bill 2333 passed the Senate Committee on Financial Institutions and Insurance.
The bill extended the repose period to 10 years and added a section relating to affirma-
tive defenses for governmental units. See S. 2333, 46th Wash. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1979) (1st
substitute bill).
Thereafter, the author participated with several other members of the senate in
negotiations on the bill that involved representatives of the Association of Washington
Business, the Boeing Company, the insurance industry, the Washington State Bar Asso-
ciation, the Washington State Trial Lawyers Association, and the Seattle City Attorney.
Many changes to the bill, including a defining of the extent to which industrial insurance
liens could be affected by a product liability claim, exceptions to the strict repose period,
and more extensive defenses to government units, were adopted. The bill passed the
senate as amended. The house of representatives adopted many further changes to the
bill, including an exemption from coverage under the bill for nuclear accidents, and sent
the bill back to the senate.
12. S. Fl. Res. 140, 46th Wash. Leg., 1st Ex. Sess. (1979). The resolution established
the Washington State Senate Select Committee on Tort and Product Liability Reform
and charged it with the specific task of studying "proposals for reform of the tort system
and the effects of reform, including but not limited to plaintiff recovery, workers' com-
pensation and insurance costs." Id.
S. Fl. Res. 236, 46th Wash. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1980), continued the existence of the
select committee and charged it with the responsibility of reporting its findings and rec-
ommendations to the senate prior to commencement of the 1981 legislative session.
13. The members of the committee included the author, Senator Del Bausch of
Olympia, Senator R. Ted Bottiger of Graham, Senator George Clarke of Mercer Island,
Senator Jeannette Hayner of Walla Walla, Senator John Jones of Bellevue, and Senator
Don Talley of Kelso. See WASHINGTON STATE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON TORT &
PRODUCT LIABILITY REFORM, FINAL REPORT 1 (1981) [hereinafter cited as RE.PORT].
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the legislature." Furthermore, because of behind-the-scenes
negotiations between the various interests concerned with prod-
uct liability and tort reform in the 1979 session,15 it was also the
author's feeling that the process of the senate select committee
should be as open and as public as possible.
The senate select committee directed the committee staff to
gather information about product liability and tort reform laws
from other jurisdictions. The staff contacted people with exper-
tise in the area of product liability law, product liability insur-
ance, and tort reform generally. The findings and recommenda-
tions of the United States Commerce Department's Task Force
on Product Liability and Accident Compensation and the closed
claim survey of the Insurance Services Office, an independent
insurance industry statistical and rate-making organization,
were examined very closely.' 6
The committee took testimony in a series of public hearings
across the state on the issues of product liability and tort
reform.'7  The committee heard from Professor Victor E.
Schwartz, Chairman of the United States Commerce Depart-
ment Task Force on Product Liability and Accident Compensa-
tion, representatives from the Washington State Trial Lawyers
Associations, representatives from the Washington Association
of Defense Counsel, representatives of the Insurance Services
Office in San Francisco, representatives from the insurance
industry and various business groups, and representatives from
the Washington State Bar Association. 8 Nine public hearings
were held prior to the 1981 legislative session.' 9
Additionally, the senate select committee sent the various
insurance companies doing business in the State of Washington
14. The battle over products liability in the 1979 session was the subject of very
extensive media coverage. In its most simplistic form, the debate devolved into a battle
in which proponents of the bill were labeled "anti-consumer," while opponents of the bill
were charged with being "anti-business." The charges became much more heated when
Senate bill 2333 ultimately failed to pass the legislature.
15. The author had the opportunity to participate in negotiations on a product lia-
bility and tort reform bill in the 1979 session of the legislature. See note 11 supra. Those
negotiations were conducted in private with members of the senate and various interest
groups present. The public hearing of the Senate Committee on Financial Institutions
and Insurance was only a preliminary to these negotiating sessions conducted behind
closed doors in the room of the Senate Majority Caucus.
16. REPORT, supra note 13, at 8-10.
17. Id. at 4-8.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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a questionnaire concerning their volume of business, profitabil-
ity, and claims and litigation experience in the product liability
field.' 0 The committee requested information for the years 1973
to 1978.1 Fifteen of the eighteen companies to whom the ques-
tionnaires were directed responded to the senate select
committee.'2
In general, it was clear from the survey of the senate select
committee that there had been a large increase in product liabil-
ity insurance costs between 1974 and 1976." Product liability
losses exceeded premiums generally for all companies during the
period from 1973 to 1975.2" However, as new rates began to be
reflected after 1975, the profitability of most companies
improved greatly and only a small number of companies
responding to the questionnaire indicated an unacceptable loss/
premium ratio for the years 1977 and 1978.5 Because of the lim-
ited participation of businesses in the Insurance Commissioner's
program designed to provide product liability insurance to high
risk insureds, there did not seem to be as severe a problem
regarding the availability of product liability insurance in Wash-
ington as was originally anticipated.2' The questionnaire also
revealed that the greatest number of product liability claims
closed were for amounts under $10,000.00. s
Because of uncertainties in the development of product lia-
bility law in this and other states and relatively high insurance
20. See id. at 12. The questionnaire sought the following information for the years
1973 through 1978: number of policies written, earned premium dollar value of those
policies, profit or loss on product liability insurance, loss-to-premium ratios, use of Insur-
ance Services Office (ISO) services, number of product liability claims, and number of
lawsuits and the results of those lawsuits. Id. at 12-13.
The Insurance Commissioner is developing mandatory reporting of this type of data
for product liability insurance on forms adopted by the National Association of Insur-
ance Commissioners. See id. at 15.
21. Id. at 12.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 13.
24. Id. at 14.
25. Id.
26. Id. Only a very small number of firms participated in the Insurance Com-
missioner's Map-Wash Program. That program was designed to help find insurers for
high risk enterprises that could not find product liability insurance coverage in the mar-
ketplace. Id.
The cost of product liability coverage, however, may have been high enough to cause
firms to forego insurance coverage entirely. See Model Uniform Product Liability Act
§ 101(A)(3), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,713, 62,716 (1979).
27. REPORT, supra note 13, at 14.
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premiums for product liability insurance due to underwriter
uncertainty about the risk associated with product liability, 8 the
select committee felt that a product liability statute was needed
to establish clear guidelines for the assertion of a product liabil-
ity cause of action and to provide a fair apportionment of
responsibility for fault among or between tortfeasors. Senate bill
3158, based in part on the Model Uniform Product Liability Act
of the United States Commerce Department Task Force on
Product Liability and Accident Compensation" and the Uni-
form Comparative Fault Act,30 was introduced in the 1981 ses-
sion of the legislature and passed with little controversy."1
In attempting to make clear the intent of the legislature
with respect to Senate bill 3158, the Senate Select Committee on
Tort and Product Liability prepared a draft report with a sec-
tion-by-section analysis of the bill. That analysis was incorpo-
rated into the Journal of the Senate at the time the bill passed
the senate. The draft report and the final report of the commit-
tee, along with questions and answers on the floor of the senate
concerning specific issues of legislative intent, should become
part of the legislative history of the Act."' Furthermore, for
those sections based on the Model Uniform Product Liability
Law, the section-by-section analysis for the Model Uniform
Product Liability Act 3 should also be of assistance in interpret-
ing the provisions of Senate bill 3158.
28. The extreme variations in the premiums for product liability insurance between
1973 and 1979 reported to the Washington State Senate Select Committee on Tort &
Product Liability Reform reflected the uncertainty on the part of insurance underwriters
about the trend in the law of product liability. See id. at 13. See also Model Uniform
Product Liability Act § 101, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,713, 62,716-17 (1979).
29. See note 9 supra.
30. 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 33 (master ed. Supp. 1980).
31. The bill was initially heard in the Senate Judiciary Committee where there was
little opposition to its enactment. The bill passed the senate 43 to 5. The bill was subse-
quently heard in the House Law, Justice, and Ethics Committee and passed the house 97
to 1. Governor Spellman signed the bill on April 17, 1981. See Act of April 17, 1981, ch.
27, 1981 Wash. Laws 112.
32. It was the author's belief that a legislative history more complete than is the
usual practice in this state was particularly critical for this controversial bill which will
undoubtedly face early judicial scrutiny.
33. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,713, 62,716-50 (1979).
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III. SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE ACT
A. Definition of the Cause of Action
The portions of the Tort and Product Liability Reform Act
defining a product liability cause of action were substantially
adopted from the Model Uniform Product Liability Act." The
committee believed that existing Washington law defining the
cause of action for product liability was confusing.3 5 The Wash-
ington Supreme Court in the case of Seattle-First National
Bank v. Tabert,"6 adopted the consumer expectation test for
analyzing whether or not the manufacturer of products should
be held strictly accountable for any damage caused by that
product. Washington's Tort and Product Liability Reform Act
preserves the consumer expectation test as the touchstone of the
analysis of whether or not to impose liability, but sets forth
explicit definitions for a product liability claim. 7
34. Model Uniform Product Liability Act § 102(D), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,713, 62,717
(1979). Compare Act of April 17, 1981, ch. 27, § 4, 1981 Wash. Laws 112.
35. The committee noted in its Report:
Historically, one of the most confusing areas in product liability tort law
involves the variety of causes of actions-such as negligence, warranty and
strict liability-available to the plaintiff seeking recovery for injuries allegedly
resulting from a defective product. Testimony before the Select Committee
reflected general agreement that the creation of a single cause of action,
termed a 'product liability claim' in the UPLA, eliminates this confusion and
should be adopted.
RoPORT, supra note 13, at 16. The committee also felt that a clarification of the various
types of product claims, for example, product defect, design defect, inadequate warnings,
or breach of warranty, was essential.
36. 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975). The Washington Supreme Court stated:
Thus, we hold that liability is imposed under section 402A if a product is
not reasonably safe. This means that it must be unsafe to an extent beyond
that which would be reasonably contemplated by the ordinary consumer. This
evaluation of the product in terms of the reasonable expectations of the ordi-
nary consumer allows the trier of the fact to take into account the intrinsic
nature of the product. The purchaser of a Volkswagen cannot reasonably
expect the same degree of safety as would the buyer of the much more expen-
sive Cadillac. It must be borne in mind that we are dealing with a relative, not
an absolute concept.
In determining the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer, a
number of factors must be considered. The relative cost of the product, the
gravity of the potential harm from the claimed defect and the cost and feasibil-
ity of eliminating or minimizing the risk may be relevant in a particular case.
In other instances the nature of the product or the nature of the claimed defect
may make other factors relevant to the issue.
Id. at 154, 542 P.2d at 779.
37. Act of April 17, 1981, ch. 27, § 4(3), 1981 Wash. Laws 112. See also Ra, owr,
supra note 13, at 35-37.
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Under existing Washington law, various theories have been
advanced as the basis for a cause of action for product liability
including strict liability, negligence, warranty, contract, and
others. 8 Section 2(4) of the Tort and Product Liability Reform
Act provides that there shall be a single cause of action termed a"product liability claim" for any damage caused by the "manu-
facture, production, making, construction, fabrication, design,
formula, preparation, assembly, installation, testing, warnings,
instructions, marketing, packaging, storage or labeling of the rel-
evant product." 3 Section 4 of the Act defines the burden of
proof for each of the types of product liability claims. The con-
cept of strict liability is retained for actions based on warranty
or product defects.' 0
In a more substantial departure from existing law, a negli-
gence standard is imposed for those cases involving a defective
product design or inadequate warnings." To demonstrate a
38. The supreme court in Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wash. 2d 522, 452 P.2d 729
(1969), discussed the history of claims involving defective products and the various theo-
ries utilized in this state to establish liability against the manufacturer of a defective
product. The court adopted the formulation of a product liability claim found in the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF TORTS § 402A (1965), but noted that the rule of section 402A
was "not exclusive." 75 Wash. 2d at 531, 452 P.2d at 734. See also Berg v. Stromme, 79
Wash. 2d 184, 484 P.2d 380 (1971).
39. All prior theories for the pleading of a claim for product liability are abolished
by the Act. Except insofar as limited in the Act itself, section 2(4) provides for a single
cause of action and section 4 provides for the burden of proof for the various aspects of
that single cause of action. Thus, for a cause of action arising after the effective date of
Senate bill 3158, negligence, warranty, etc. cannot form the basis for a cause of action
involving product liability. A party need only plead the existence of a product liability
claim and meet the burden of proof set forth in section 4 for a claim against a manufac-
turer. REPORT, supra note 13, at 32.
40. The concept of strict liability in product liability claims in Washington
originated with the adoption of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), by
the supreme court in Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wash. 2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969).
The supreme court in Wenatchee Wenoka Growers Ass'n v. Krack Corp., 89 Wash. 2d
847, 853, 576 P.2d 388, 391 (1978), rejected the notion that Washington's interpretation
of section 402A rested on negligence per se and stated: "Washington is a no-fault state
with respect to claims originating under Restatement § 402A." This no-fault notion was
reaffirmed in Seay v. Chrysler Corp., 93 Wash. 2d 319, 609 P.2d 1382 (1980).
The committee felt that strict liability was the appropriate analytical tool for cases
involving product defect or breach of warranty. The cases involving design defects or
inadequate warnings were believed to be more appropriately analyzed in negligence
terms because those cases, although framed in strict liability terminology, more closely
resemble negligence cases. REPORT, supra note 13, at 37.
41. The Washington courts have indicated that strict liability is applicable in all
product liability claims regardless of whether the theory is product defect, design defect,
or inadequate warnings. In Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 149-50,
542 P.2d 774, 776 (1975), the supreme court specifically applied strict liability in a design
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defect in design, the trier of the fact must look to see if:
at the time of manufacture, the likelihood that the product
would cause the claimant's harm or similar harms, and the
seriousness of those harms, outweighed the burden on the
manufacturer to design a product that would have prevented
those harms and the adverse effect that an alternative design
that was practical and feasible would have on the usefulness of
the product.'2
The plaintiff thus bears the burden of demonstrating an alterna-
tive design that was practical and feasible. For an action based
on the inadequacy of the-product warnings, it must be shown
that:
at the time of manufacture, the likelihood that the product will
cause the claimant's harm or similar harms, and the serious-
ness of those harms, rendered the warnings or instructions of
the manufacturer inadequate and the manufacturer could have
provided the warnings or instructions which the claimant
alleges would have been adequate.43
The Act also specifically adopts a post-manufacture duty for
product manufacturers to warn consumers of dangers with
respect to a product."
defect case:
A product may be just as dangerous and capable of producing injury
whether its condition arises from a defect in design or from a defect in the
manufacturing process. While a manufacturing defect may be more easily iden-
tified or proved, a design defect may produce an equally dangerous product.
The end result is the same, a defective product for which strict liability should
attach.
The supreme court applied a similar strict liability analysis to cases involving inadequate
warnings in Teagle v. Fischer & Porter Co., 89 Wash. 2d 149, 570 P.2d 438 (1977). The
court also rejected the contention that negligence was a factor in the adequacy of warn-
ings in Little v. PPG Indus., Inc., 92 Wash. 2d 118, 594 P.2d 911 (1979).
42. Act of April 17, 1981, ch. 27, § 4(1)(a), 1981 Wash. Laws 112.
43. Id. § 4(1)(b). A manufacturer need not warn of an obvious or open danger.
Haysom v. Coleman Lantern Co., 89 Wash. 2d 474, 479, 573 P.2d 785, 789 (1978).
44. Act of April 17, 1981, ch. 27, § 4(1)(c), 1981 Wash. Laws 112, states:
A product is not reasonably safe because adequate warnings or instruc-
tions were not provided after the product was manufactured where a manufac-
turer learned or where a reasonably prudent manufacturer should have learned
about a danger connected with the product after it was manufactured. In such
a case, the manufacturer is under a duty to act with regard to issuing warnings
or instructions concerning the danger in the manner that a reasonably prudent
manufacturer would act in the same or similar circumstances. This duty is sat-
isfied if the manufacturer exercises reasonable care to inform product users.
Although there are no Washington cases on a post-manufacture duty to warn, the com-
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Claims based on fraud, intentionally caused harm, or the
Consumer Protection Act, chapter 19.86 of the Revised Code of
Washington, are not covered by the Act. 5 The recovery of direct
or consequential economic loss under title 62A of the Revised
Code of Washingon, the Uniform Commercial Code, is also not
covered by the Act.46 Finally, the Act preserves the existing
Washington law on damages, although the Model Uniform Prod-
uct Liability Act proposed a restriction on the items of damages
that may be recoverable by a claimant in a product liability
claim.4 7 The select committee felt that judicial elaboration of the
items of damages recoverable by claimants in product liability
actions was warranted.
B. Retailer Relief
The Act attempts to allow relief from liability for sellers of
products.48 The select committee heard from retailer organiza-
mittee believed liability should extend to manufacturers in such a situation, as did the
promulgators of the Model Uniform Product Liability Act. See Model Uniform Product
Liability Act § 104(c)(6), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,713, 62,721 (1979).
45. Act of April 17, 1981, ch. 27, § 2(4), 1981 Wash. Laws 112.
46. Id. §§ 2(6), 3(2); REPORT, supra note 13, at 32-33. See also Model Uniform Prod-
uct Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,713, 62,719 (1979). The committee felt that recovery
for direct or consequential economic loss should be left to the Uniform Commercial
Code. The parties could appropriately contract in the commercial setting on those issues.
In Berg v. General Motors Corp., 87 Wash. 2d 584, 555 P.2d 818 (1976), the supreme
court held that a purchaser of a defective engine for a fishing boat could recover from
the manufacturer the economic loss, i.e., profits lost from fishing, caused by the defective
product. The Act overrules the Berg case and adopts the analysis of the California
Supreme Court in Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17
(1965), that the Uniform Commercial Code governs as to recovery for direct or conse-
quential economic loss, but that there is no product liability claim under the Act for
direct or consequential economic loss standing alone. Senate bill 3158 is confined to
physical harm to persons and property and leaves economic loss, standing alone, to the
UCC. See also Daughtry v. Jet Aeration Co., 91 Wash. 2d 794, 592 P.2d 631 (1979).
47. The Model Uniform Product Liability Act defines "harm" as:
(1) damage to property; (2) personal physical injuries, illness and death; (3)
mental anguish or emotional harm attendant to such personal physical injuries,
illness or death; and (4) mental anguish or emotional harm caused by the
claimant's being placed in direct personal physical danger and manifested by a
substantial objective symptom. The term 'harm' does not include direct or
consequential economic loss.
Model Uniform Product Liability Act § 102(F), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,713, 62,717 (1979). The
committee declined to adopt the Model Uniform Product Liability Act's strict definition
of harm, particularly as to mental anguish or emotional harm not directly attendant
upon personal physical injuries or illness.
48. Act of April 17, 1981, ch. 27, § 5, 1981 Wash. Laws 112. The Act also indicates
that sellers of products include those who sell products and those who lease products. Id.
§ 2(1). Lessors of products in Washington have been held subject to product liability
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tions and small business organizations that too often their mem-
bers were subjected to claims for product liability when, in fact,
the manufacturer was responsible for the defect in the product.
The Act provides that a seller of a product is not liable to the
claimant unless that seller was in some fashion negligent,
breached an express warranty, or intentionally misrepresented
or concealed facts or information about the product.4 9
In certain instances, as a matter of policy, it was felt that a
product seller should be responsible for the damages associated
with a product liability claim even if the defect in the product
was the manufacturer's responsibility. A product seller will be
responsible for the damages to a claimant if, in general, the
product manufacturer is unable to respond to judgment in
Washington or the product seller is substantially controlled by
the product manufacturer.8
actions, Baker v. City of Seattle, 79 Wash. 2d 198, 484 P.2d 405 (1971); wholesalers and
retailers were held subject to product liability in Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86
Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975). See 45 WASH. L. REv. 431 (1970).
The term "product seller" does not include most sellers of real property, profes-
sionals who utilize products, second hand dealers, and finance lessors.
49. Act of April 17, 1981, ch. 27, § 5(1), 1981 Wash. Laws 112, states:
[A] product seller other than a manufacturer is liable to the claimant only
if the claimant's harm was proximately caused by:
(a) The negligence of such product seller; or
(b) Breach of an express warranty made by such product seller; or
(c) The intentional misrepresentation of facts about the product by such
product seller or the intentional concealment of information about the product
by such product seller.
50. Act of April 17, 1981, ch. 27, § 5(2), 1981 Wash. Laws 112, provides:
A product seller, other than a manufacturer, shall have the liability of a
manufacturer to the claimant if:
(a) No solvent manufacturer who would be liable to the claimant is sub-
ject to service of process under the laws of the claimant's domicile or the state
of Washington; or
(b) The court determines that it is highly probable that the claimant
would be unable to enforce a judgment against any manufacturer; or
(c) The product seller is a controlled subsidiary of a manufacturer, or the
manufacturer is a controlled subsidiary of the product seller; or
(d) The product seller provided the plans or specifications for the manu-
facture or preparation of the product and such plans or specifications were a
proximate cause of the defect in the product; or
(e) The product was marketed under a trade name or brand name of the
product seller.
The factual situations noted in (a) and (b) should be determined at the time of the filing
of the product liability action.
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C. State of the Art and Custom in the Industry
In a departure from the provisions of the Model Uniform
Product Liability Act concerning compliance or noncompliance
with industry custom, technological feasibility, and government
and nongovernment regulatory standards," the senate select
committee felt that evidence of custom in the industry, techno-
logical feasibility, or compliance or noncompliance with govern-
ment or nongovernment standards should go to the trier of fact,
but should not carry any presumption as to liability.2 Section 6
of Washington's Tort and Product Liability Reform Act was not
intended to overrule the line of cases in Washington that have
held negligence per se applicable to the violation of a statutory
or administrative standard," but is merely designed to permit,
on an evidentiary basis, the transmission of information con-
cerning the background to the manufacture of the product to
51. The Model Uniform Product Liability Act provides that industry custom, safety
or performance standards, and practical technological feasibility are relevant to the
establishment or defense of a product liability claim, but practical technological feasibil-
ity, legislative or administrative standards, and mandatory government specifications
carry liability implications. Model Uniform Product Liability Act §§ 107, 108, 44 Fed.
Reg. 62,713, 62,728-31 (1979).
52. Act of April 17, 1981, ch. 27, § 6(1), 1981 Wash. Laws 112, states:
Evidence of custom in the product seller's industry, technological feasibil-
ity or that the product was or was not, in compliance with nongovernmental
standards or with legislative regulatory standards, or administrative regulatory
standards, whether relating to design, construction or performance of the prod-
uct or to warnings or instructions as to its use may be considered by the trier
of fact.
Under previous Washington law, the treatment of industry custom, nongovernmen-
tal standards, and state of the art in an industry was unclear. In Haysom v. Coleman
Lantern Co., 89 Wash. 2d 474, 573 P.2d 785 (1978), the supreme court held that the
introduction of a nongovernmental safety code was discretionary with the trial court. In
Cantu v. John Deere Co., 24 Wash. App. 701, 603 P.2d 839 (1979), rehearing denied, 93
Wash. 2d 1011 (1980), the court held that where the plaintiff makes state of the art or
industry standards an issue, the defendant is entitled to respond. The court in Cantu did
not discuss whether a defendant could first raise the issue.
53. See, e.g., Kelley v. Howard S. Wright Construction Co., 90 Wash. 2d 323, 582
P.2d 500 (1978); Bayne v. Todd Shipyard Corp., 88 Wash. 2d 917, 568 P.2d 771 (1977).
In Davis v. Niagara Machine Co., 90 Wash. 2d 342, 581 P.2d 1344 (1978), the supreme
court held that WISHA safety regulations do not create a duty running from an
employer to a third-party manufacturer because the statute intended to protect
employees only.
The committee adopted section 6, as an evidentiary rule. See REPORT, supra note 13,
at 39-40. If a plaintiff can establish that the defendant violated an administrative or
legislative standard, liability should attach per se if the Davis test is met. Similarly, a
plaintiff's violation of such a standard can carry liability implications. Berry v. Coleman
Systems Co., 23 Wash. App. 622, 596 P.2d 1365, rehearing denied, 92 Wash. 2d 1026
(1979).
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the trier of fact.
This section also provides that compliance with a specific
mandatory government contract specification relating to design
or warnings by the manufacturer shall be an absolute defense to
a product liability claim." Conversely, failure by a manufacturer
to comply with a specific mandatory government specification
shall result in a finding that the product was not reasonably safe
within the meaning of section 4(1). The intention of section 6
was to indicate that where any government imposed upon a
manufacturer certain requirements with respect to a product,
the manufacturer would not be held responsible for liability
based on negligence under section 4(1). The manufacturer would
still be subject to strict liability for a defective product or a
breach of warranty under section 4(2). Section 6 applies only in
the government contract situation and only in instances where
the specification was mandatory for the manufacturer. It is not
intended to apply where the manufacturer had any role in
negotiating the specification with the applicable government
agency.55
D. Statute of Repose and Statute of Limitations
Because of business and insurance industry concern regard-
ing the "tail" on product liability claims," the select committee
felt that a statute of repose was necessary; the committee did
not feel that it was fair to hold manufacturers responsible for
damages caused by products whose useful safe life had passed.
Section 7 of the Act provides that a product seller is not liable to
a claimant if the harm was caused after the "useful safe life" of
a product. The "useful safe life" is presumed to be 12 years
although that presumption may be rebutted by a preponderance
54. Act of April 17, 1981, ch. 27, § 6(2), 1981 Wash. Laws 112. This section speaks
only to a product claim based on design defect or inadequate warnings, and not a claim
based on section 4(2) product defect or warranty. Building to mandatory government
specifications suggests that the government established the standard for design and cre-
ated the intrinsic problems with the product that require a warning to users, and the
government should bear any liability for design features it mandated. Model Uniform
Product Liability Act § 108(D), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,713, 62,730 (1979). Note, the absence of
the word "contract" after "government" in the second sentence of section 6(2) was
inadvertent and carries no interpretational implications.
55. A question and answer on the floor of the Senate regarding this issue is reported
in the Senate Journal (to be printed in 1982) and substantiates this assertion.
56. REPORT, supra note 13, at 9.
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of the evidence." Specific exceptions to the statute of repose
concept-products warranted for a longer period of time, prod-
ucts about which the product seller has intentionally misrepre-
sented or concealed facts or information, and products that
involve prolonged exposure to harm-were set forth in section7(1)(b)."
With respect to the statute of limitations, the committee
specifically considered the case of Ohler v. Tacoma General
Hospital,59 in which the Washington Supreme Court adopted
the discovery rule for product liability actions. Section 7(3) of
the Act is designed to overrule the Ohler case and to return
Washington to the standard that the statute of limitations runs
from "the time the claimant discovered or in the exercise of due
diligence should have discovered the harm and its cause." Ohler
demanded knowledge on the part of the claimant of all legal ele-
ments of the cause of action before the statute of limitations
ran,10 and the committee felt that this rendered the statute of
57. The concept of the "useful safe life" was adopted from the Model Uniform
Product Liability Act. Whereas the Model Uniform Act adopts an evidentiary standard
of "clear and convincing" before the presumption of 10 years may be rebutted, section
7(2) of the Washington Act states that the presumption may be rebutted by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, and sets forth a twelve-year presumption. Act of Apr. 17, 1981,
ch. 27, § 7(2), 1981 Wash. Laws 112. Compare Model Uniform Product Liability Act
§ 110, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,713, 62,732 (1979).
The committee felt the 12-year period was fairer and that the burden of proof to
rebut the presumption should be a preponderance of the evidence in order that a claim-
ant could present his or her claim to the trier of fact. The statute of repose should oper-
ate to bar a claim only if the evidence was clear that the useful safe life had expired. The
time of the useful safe life is measured from the time of delivery. REPORT, supra note 13,
at 40-43.
58. Act of April 17, 1981, ch. 27, § 7(1)(b), 1981 Wash. Laws 112, provides:
A product seller may be subject to liability for harm caused by a product
used beyond its useful safe life, if:
(i) The product seller has warranted that the product may be utilized
safely for such longer period; or
(ii) The product seller intentionally misrepresents facts about its prod-
uct, or intentionally conceals information about it, and that conduct was a
proximate cause of the claimant's harm; or
(iii) The harm was caused by exposure to a defective product, which
exposure first occurred within the useful safe life of the product, even though
the harm did not manifest itself until after the useful safe life had expired.
The committee believed that there were certain instances in which, for reasons of
public policy, the statute of repose concept should not apply. Those instances are enu-
merated in section 7(1)(b). See REPORT, supra note 13, at 41-42.
59. 92 Wash. 2d 507, 598 P.2d 1358 (1979).
60. The supreme court in Ohler stated: "We hold that appellant's claim against
Tacoma General did not accrue until she discovered or reasonably should have discov-
ered all of the essential elements of her possible cause of action, i.e., duty, breach, causa-
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limitations virtually nonexistent in the absence of a legislative
change.
E. Comparative Fault
Washington adopted comparative negligence in 1973.01 At
that time, the Washington Legislature intended to abrogate the
doctrine of contributory negligence, which completely barred a
negligent plaintiff from recovering damages from a negligent
defendant.2 That statute, however, did not address those situa-
tions where an additional degree of fault was present such as
gross negligence, recklessness, willful and wanton misconduct, or
strict liability. In Seay v. Chrysler Corp.,68 the Washington
Supreme Court held that a plaintiff's contributory negligence
could not be a damage reducing factor in a product liability
action. Specifically, the supreme court declined to recognize the
concept of comparative fault in a product liability action.
In sections 8, 9, and 10 of the Act, the select committee
adopted the concept of comparative fault for product liability
actions. The Act allows for "pure" comparative fault," in which
the fault of the claimant, as defined in section 9, could be com-
pared against the fault of the defendant. The Act provides that
any nonintentional conduct of the claimant may be compared to
tion, damages." Id. at 507, 598 P.2d at 1360. The court also stated:
While we agree with the trial court that the discovery rule should be extended
to this products liability case, we disagree with the court's formulation and
application of the rule. Like our above holding about Tacoma General, we now
hold that appellant's claim against Air Shields did not accrue until after she
discovered or reasonably should have discovered all the essential elements of
her possible cause of action.
Id. at 514, 598 P.2d at 1362.
61. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.22.010 (1979). Section 17 of the Act repeals title 4, section
22.010 of the Revised Code of Washington, the comparative negligence statute. The
Committee intended that section 17 should be read in connection with section 15. Com-
parative negligence should remain the law of the State of Washington for all claims aris-
ing prior to the effective date of the new Product Liability Act. For all acts arising there-
after, the concept of comparative fault contained in sections 8 through 10 applies.
62. The supreme court in Godfrey v. State, 84 Wash. 2d 959, 965, 530 P.2d 630, 633
(1975), indicated that WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.010 "changes the factor of contributory
negligence from a total bar to recovery to a factor that mitigates damages." (court's
emphasis).
63. 93 Wash. 2d 319, 609 P.2d 1382 (1980).
64. "Pure" comparative fault may be distinguished from the comparative fault sys-
tem adopted in several jurisdictions where a contributory bar is present if the plaintiff's
fault exceeds 50% or exceeds that of the defendant. Washington's "pure" system permits
the plaintiff to recover "the most miniscule amount to near total recovery." Godfrey v.
State, 84 Wash. 2d 959, 965, 530 P.2d 630, 633 (1975).
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the conduct of the defendant.68
F. Joint and Several Liability
The Washington Supreme Court in the case of Seattle-First
National Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co.,O" held that joint and
several liability was the proper theory for apportionment of
damages against multiple tortfeasors. The select committee
agreed with the supreme court that joint and several liability
must be the rule for liability in Washington. The select commit-
tee felt that, although the fault of various defendants should be
more equitably apportioned via contribution, the injured plain-
tiff should be able to recover the full amount of loss sustained
by plaintiff by any or all of the defendants. The loss of the
plaintiff was an integral whole and recovery should not rest on
the fortuity of whether a particular defendant was able to
respond to judgment.6
65. Act of April 17, 1981, ch. 27, § 9, 1981 Wash. Laws 112, defines "fault" as: "acts
or omissions, including misuse of a product, that are in any measure negligent or reckless
toward the person or property of the actor or others, or that subject a person to strict
tort liability or liability on a product liability claim."
66. 91 Wash. 2d 230, 588 P.2d 1308 (1978).
67. This view was very aptly expressed by the supreme court in Shoreline Concrete:
[T]he harm caused by both joint and concurrent tort-feasors is indivisible. The
distinguishing factor between these types of tort-feasors is the duty breached.
Joint tort-feasors breach a joint duty whereas concurrent tort-feasors breach
separate duties.
Since the harm caused by both joint and concurrent tort-feasors is indivis-
ible, similar liability attaches. We have long held that such tortfeasors are
each liable for the entire harm caused and the injured party may sue one or all
to obtain full recovery. While respondent correctly notes that such liability at
common law applies only to joint tort-feasors, the indivisible nature of the
harm caused by both of these tort-feasors requires at a minimum, that each be
wholly responsible for the entire harm caused.
While the indivisibility of the harm caused warrants imposition of entire
liability upon those tort-feasors, sound policy reasons also support application
of the procedural, or several, aspect of the liability rule. The cornerstone of
tort law is the assurance of full compensation to the injured party. To attain
this goal, the procedural aspect or our rule permits the injured party to seek
full recovery from any one or all of such tortfeasors. So long as each tort-fea-
sor's conduct is found to have been a proximate cause of the indivisible harm,
we can conceive of no reason for relieving that tort-feasor of his responsibility
to make full compensation for all harm he has caused the injured party. What
may be equitable between multiple tort-feasors is an issue totally divorced
from what is fair to the injured party.
Id. at 235-36, 588 P.2d at 1310.
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G. Contribution
Some of the most controversial portions of Senate bill 2333
in the 1979 legislative session were those sections of the bill
pertaining to the apportionment of fault.8 The Washington
Supreme Court in Wenatchee Wenoka Growers Association v.
Krack Corp.,9 refused to recognize the concept of contribution
among tortfeasors in this state. The select committee felt, how-
ever, that some mechanism to more equitably apportion fault
among or between joint tortfeasors was necessary. For that rea-
son, the committee adopted the right of contribution of section
12 and 13.
The Tort and Product Liability Reform Act abolishes the
common law right of indemnity between active and passive
tortfeasors and establishes the right of contribution. The right of
contribution may be enforced in the original action or in a sepa-
rate action and a one-year statute of limitations is adopted for
the independent contribution action. 0 Where one party has
completely discharged the liability of the claimant, contribution
is still available against other joint tortfeasors.1'
The statute does not speak to the issue of whether an action
for contribution by a manufacturer over and against a negligent
employer in a workplace injury is available. The supreme court
68. Engrossed Senate bill 2333 passed the Washington Senate and provided in sec-
tion 2 for the allocation of fault. S. 2333, 46th Wash. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1979) (engrossed
bill). The trier of fact was to establish a percentage of fault for each claimant, each
defendant, who was a retailer, distributor or manufacturer, each third party defendant,
each immune party such as an employer, and each person released by the claimant. Id.
§ 2(1). The court was to enter judgment against each defendant individually for the per-
centage allocated by the trier of fact. If a defendant was insolvent, that defendant's fault
was reallocated to all other parties. Id. § 2(5). Section 12 of Engrossed Senate bill 2333
also allowed the lien of the Department of Labor and Industries in a workplace injury to
be that figure by which benefits exceeded the share of liability of the claimant, the
employer, and the claimant's fellow servants. Id. § 12. The Act does not permit the
apportionment of fault to the "empty chair," i.e., parties not joined in the lawsuit, as
Engrossed Senate bill 2333 would have allowed.
69. 89 Wash. 2d 847, 576 P.2d 388 (1978).
70. Act of April 17, 1981, ch. 27, §§ 12(1), 13(2)-(3), 1981 Wash. Laws 112. The
committee intended that the right of contribution be substituted for the common law
right of active/passive indemnity. Active/passive indemnity provided by the common law
applies in all those claims in which the right of contribution provided by the statute is
not allowed. The committee did not intend that parties would not have available to them
the common law right of active/passive indemnity and the right of contribution allowed
in the new Product Liability Act.
71. Id. § 12(2).
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in Seattle-First National Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co.,72
rejected the possibility of such third party action. The Act does
not speak directly to the issue of the workplace injury because
the committee believed that other committees of the legislature
dealing with the questions of industrial insurance should
attempt to deal with this issue. It is possible, however, to argue
that the enactment of a statutory right of contribution does not
permit the allegation of a third party claim for contribution over
and against a negligent employer. 3
Sections 12, 13, and 14 of the Act apply to all tort actions,
not just to product liability actions. The select committee felt
that the right of contribution should be available throughout the
tort law system in the State of Washington.7
H. Settlement Agreements
Section 14 of the Act provides that where a party enters
72. 91 Wash. 2d 230, 588 P.2d 1308 (1978).
73. REPORT, supra note 13, at 25-26. The Washington Supreme Court has held that
the Industrial Insurance Act "immunizes" the conduct of an employer so as to bar a
third party action for indemnity or contribution by a manufacturer against that
employer. That bar is not present where the employer voluntarily assumes an independ-
ent duty or obligation to the third party. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete
Co., 91 Wash. 2d 230, 588 P.2d 1308 (1978).
It could be argued that the Act expressly adopts the fault apportionment policy of
contribution and thereby implicitly overrules the Industrial Insurance Act employer
immunity, or that the Act expands upon those instances where an "independent duty"
may be discerned by the courts. Carl J. Madsen, Inc. v. Babler Bros., 25 Wash. App. 880,
610 P.2d 958 (1980). See also Redford v. City of Seattle, 94 Wash. 2d 198, 615 P.2d 1285
(1980).
74. Two Senate Resolutions created the Washington State Senate Select Committee
on Tort and Product Liability Reform, and charged the committee with the responsibil-
ity of proposing changes in the entire tort system, not just product liability. S. Fl. Res.
236, 46th Wash. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1980); S. Fl. Res. 140, 46th Wash. Leg., 1st Ex. Ses.
(1979). Sections 8 through 14 of the Act deal essentially with the entire Washington tort
system and are to be codified in a section of the Revised Code of Washington separate
from that of sections 2 through 7 of the Act, relating to product liability. Act of April 17,
1981, ch. 27, § 16, 1981 Wash. Laws 112.
It could be suggested that the Act contains two subjects in violation of WASH.
CONST. art. 2, § 19, which requires that a statute embrace no more than one subject. This
section of the Washington Constitution, however, is liberally construed to sustain the
validity of a statute. Water Dist. No. 105 v. State, 70 Wash. 2d 337, 485 P.2d 66 (1971).
Further, the title may be very broad where the act has numerous subjects incidental to
the title; there need be only "some rational unity" between the title and the subdivisions
in the act. Tri-M Erectors, Inc. v. Donald M. Drake Co., 25 Wash. App. 264, 606 P.2d
709 (1980). Thus, since the Act is "an act relating to tort actions" and historically, prod-
uct liability and the apportionment of fault via comparative fault and contribution have
been considered together, the argument that the bill contravenes the Washington Consti-
tution is without merit.
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into a settlement agreement with the claimant, if the settlement
agreement is a reasonable one, all liability on the part of that
defendant for contribution and for claims by the claimant is dis-
charged. The senate select committee felt that the process of
settlement of lawsuits must be encouraged. The ability of a
party entering into a settlement with the claimant to be dis-
charged from all claims, including contribution, was essential to
fulfill the policy of encouraging settlement.
To protect parties entering into settlement agreements from
the possibility that such settlement agreements would be
deemed unreasonable long after settlement was achieved, the
Act provides that a court must review a settlement agreement to
determine whether the amount paid was reasonable .7  The trial
courts will determine the reasonableness of the settlement agree-
ments on a case-by-case basis, analyzing a number of potential
factors.7
If the amount of the settlement is reasonable, the amount of
the plaintiff's claim against the remaining defendants is reduced
by the amount paid pursuant to the agreement.7 If the amount
of the settlement is unreasonable, the court must determine
what would have been a reasonable settlement and reduce the
claim of the plaintiff against the other defendants by that rea-
sonable amount.78 An unreasonable settlement does not affect
75. In adopting section 15(2) of the Act, the committee inadvertently made the sec-
tions of the Act relating to contribution retroactive without making section 14 of the Act
with respect to settlement agreements retroactive also. The committee intended that the
process for determining the reasonableness of settlement should be utilized for those
claims in which the right of contribution is retroactive.
76. No standards to guide the courts in the elaboration of what constitutes a "rea-
sonable" settlement are provided in this statute. Presumably, a multiplicity of factors
will enter into this calculation and will include such questions as the legal and evident-
iary questions present in the case, the dollar amount of the settlement in light of the
value of the case, the presence and extent of liability insurance coverage, the cost of
litigation, and other factors. REPORT, supra note 13, at 54-55.
77. Act of April 17, 1981, ch. 27 § 14(2), 1981 Wash. Laws 112.
78. Id. In a typical case, a plaintiff has brought a claim for product liability against
three defendants. Defendant 1 settles with the plaintiff for $25,000 and that settlement
is declared reasonable by the court. The plaintiff goes to trial with defendants 2 and 3.
The jury finds that plaintiff has sustained $100,000 in damages and that the plaintiff is
50% at fault while defendants 2 and 3 are each 25% at fault. The plaintiff recovers a net
judgment from defendants 2 and 3 of $50,000 and that $50,000 is reduced by the $25,000
already received by the plaintiff from defendant 1. The plaintiff makes a net recovery of
$25,000 judgment from defendants 2 and 3. Defendants 2 and 3 are jointly and severally
liable for the $25,000 figure; contribution between defendants 2 and 3 would be allowed,
but defendant 1 would be exonerated from liability for contribution.
If the settlement were found to be unreasonable, and the court finds that a reason-
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the validity of the agreement between the plaintiff and the
defendant so agreeing, but the plaintiff makes a settlement at
his risk because the court can reduce the claim of the plaintiff
against other defendants by the amount of a reasonable settle-
ment. The claims of the other defendants against the defendant
making an unreasonable settlement with the plaintiff remain
discharged by the settlement.79 Again, section 14 relating to
settlement agreements applies to all tort actions.
I. Miscellaneous Provisions
The Act modifies the existing judicial product liability law
in Washington only to the extent provided for in the statute.80
The statute applies only to those claims arising on or after the
effective date of the Act, July 26, 1981.81 The select committee
found a need for an extended effective date so that people deal-
ing with product claims could have some warning as to the
change in the law. Nevertheless, because of the importance of
the right of contribution, the Act provides that the right of con-
tribution provided in sections 12 and 13 of the Act shall be
able settlement would have been $50,000, the plaintiff would still go to trial with defend-
ants 2 and 3 and would recover a net judgment of $50,000 from those defendants. Plain-
tiff's net recovery would be zero as the $50,000 would be reduced by $50,000, the value of
the reasonable settlement.
79. Id. § 14(3). It could be argued that the contribution claims are not discharged if
the settlement between the claimant and the settling defendant was unreasonable. Sec-
tion 14(3) indicates specifically that the agreement the claimant and the defendant
entered into remains unaffected by an unreasonable settlement. The intent of section 14
generally, however, is to encourage the settlement of cases, and the discharge of a
defendant from liability for contribution by settling with a claimant is designed to effec-
tuate that policy. See REPORT, supra note 13, at 54. Even if the settlement is unreason-
able, in the absence of collusion or fraud upon the court, the settling defendant should
be exonerated from liability from contribution.
The more difficult question is whether a defendant not joined in the principal action
by the plaintiff and not joined by one of the defendants would lose a right of contribu-
tion when the plaintiff and a defendant settle. Presumably defendants ordinarily will
utilize Washington Civil Rule 14 to join other parties who are potentially liable to the
plaintiff to help defray any judgment that a plaintiff might recover. If, however, a plain-
tiff and a defendant agree to settle without joining a known defendant with the intent of
keeping that defendant from participating in the proceeding on the reasonableness of the
settlement, a right of contribution should be allowed the defendant who was not joined.
80. Act of April 17, 1981, ch. 27, § 3(1), 1981 Wash. Laws 112. Although it could be
argued that because this section refers only to sections 2 through 7, existing product
liability cases involving comparative fault and contribution apply, the argument is with-
out merit. Sections 8 through 14 of the Act, by their terms, apply to all tort actions,
including product liability actions, and change existing product liability law.
81. Id. § 15(1).
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applied retroactively to all actions in which trial on the underly-
ing actions has taken place prior to the effective date of the
Act.82 The language of "trial on the underlying action" would
mean all those instances in which there had not been a judgment
entered in the case prior to July 26, 1981.88 Settlements achieved
prior to July 26, 1981, are not affected by the retroactive appli-
cation of contribution.84
IV. Conclusion
The work on product liability and tort reform accomplished
by the Washington State Legislature in the Tort and Product
Liability Reform Act was significant from several standpoints.
The legislature attempted to deal with a highly controversial
and complex issue with detailed and careful study. The Act
itself is a product of compromises among various groups inter-
ested in the issue, but the major issues of product liability and
tort law in the State of Washington were addressed. Further-
more, because of the comprehensive nature of the changes envi-
sioned by the Act, possible future adjustments to provisions in
the Washington Product Liability Act may be required. Careful
monitoring of those possible changes by the bench and bar is
necessary in order to sustain the balanced approach to the issues
contemplated by the Senate Select Committee on Tort and
Product Liability Reform. Finally, it may be anticipated that
the provisions of the Act will be subject to close and intense
judicial scrutiny. It was the intention of the author and the
members of the select committee to provide as detailed a legisla-
tive history setting forth the intent of the legislature as could be
accomplished. The incorporation of a draft committee report
with a detailed analysis into the Senate Journal, substantial
questions and answers on the floor of the senate, and a final
report were a departure from the limited legislative history that
has been the tradition in the Washington Legislature. Commen-
82. Id. § 15(2).
83. Clearly, in some instances, a summary judgment may well have disposed of the
principal issues in the case. The author believes that in such a situation, trial on the
underlying action means the entry of a judgment on the principal issues. Furthermore,
the retroactivity feature of section 15(2) should not apply to those cases where a judg-
ment that no right of contribution existed was entered prior to April 17, 1981, the date
Governor Spellman signed the bill. The entry of a judgment differentiates such a case
"from the usual type of case contemplated by section 15(2), where no judgment on the
issue of contribution had been entered and trial had not occurred prior to July 26, 1981.
84. Act of April 17, 1981, ch. 27, § 15(2), 1981 Wash. Laws 112.
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tators have suggested the need for a balanced product liability
act in this state.8 The legislature has not heeded those who
would irrevocably damage the tort law system; the legislature
also saw the need for change in the law of product liability and
tort law; the legislature confronted the uncertainty and lack of
predictability in the law, while preserving the right of injured
consumers to obtain redress for injuries caused by defective
products.
85. See Comment, Product Liability Reform Proposals in Washington-A Public
Policy Analysis, 4 U. PUGET SD. L. REV. 143 (1980). That comment argued persuasively
for a product liability act that clearly defined the cause of action, adopted comparative
fault, and allowed a right of contribution among or between joint tortfeasors.
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